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1 Introduction
Normally, about 106 boys per 100 girls are born and there is a very slight
tendency for mothers in good condition to have more boys [Almond and Ed-
lund, 2007]. Sex selective infanticide and abortion make for more dramatic
deviations, as demonstrated by abnormally male sex ratios in countries such
as China and India. Confucianism and Hinduism share not only a unilineal
view of descent emphasizing the male line but also lack explicit condemna-
tion of infanticide { the main form of sex selection before the introduction of
ultrasound technology in the early 1980s { present in Christianity and Islam.
This paper focuses on South Korea (henceforth Korea), an East Asian
country whose demographics have received relatively little attention. In addi-
tion to being of interest in its own right, the Korean case may oer a preview
of the demographic future of India and China as they progress on their paths
of economic growth. As late as the 1960s, Korea was a poor developing coun-
try. Korea has not only taken the lead on economic growth, also been ahead
demographically. Because of extensive post-natal selection against girls in the
1960s and 1970s and rapidly falling fertility, e.g., Goodkind [1996], the bride
shortage now in the works in India and China appeared in Korea already in
the 1990s.
Moreover, sex ratios at birth started to climb in Korea following the intro-
duction of ultra-sound technology in the early 1980s. In 1990, 116.5boys per
100 girls were born. Unlike India and China, however, sex ratios have since
declined to a normal 106 in 2007, see Figure 1.1
1Korea National Statistics Oce, 2007 Annual Report on Live Births and Death Statis-
tics.
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Lower sex ratios were greeted with relief by a country increasingly appre-
hensive of the marriage market consequences of the collective proclivity to sex
select in favor of sons. The return to normal sex ratios has also been widely
interpreted to imply that son preference and sex selection have been aban-
doned,2 making for a compelling narrative of economic development ushering
in gender neutral values and practises [Chung and Das Gupta, 2007].
However, a closer look at the cross-sectional relationship between sex ratios
and parental socio-economic status paints a dierent picture. Using the 2005
census, and restricting our attention to women who had completed fertility
(45-74 years old), we nd that among those who completed their fertility more
recently (those born in the 1950s and reaching age 45 in 1995-2005) sex ratios
increased signicantly with the mother's education level, going from a below
normal sex ratio of 104 sons per 100 daughters for mothers with only primary
school education to 112 sons per 100 daughters for mothers with a college
degree or higher. However, this positive association is recent. For mothers
born in the 1930s and reaching age 45 in 1975-85 and therefore bearing their
children largely before the arrival of ultrasound and at a time Korea was
still a developing country, the relationship was reversed. Sex ratios were the
highest for the least educated mothers and declining with education level to
reach normal for college-educated women. The middle cohort, women born
in the 1940s, exhibited an essentially at relationship between sex ratios and
education level.
A positive relationship between parental status and maleness of ospring
2In 2008, the Korean Constitutional Court lifted a 1987 ban on doctors revealing the
sex of the unborn child, citing normal sex ratios as evidence that the country had moved
beyond son preference and sex selection.
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is consistent with a sex choice model where parents prefer sons, but want
sons who marry, thus creating derived demand for daughters, in equilibrium
supplied by the underclass [Edlund, 1999]. However, such a model cannot
account for the erstwhile surplus of males and negative relationship between
parental socio-economic status (SES) and ospring sex ratios or the changing
pattern observed in Korea.
In this paper, we propose that the cross-sectional and aggregate patterns
can be accounted for by changes in the economic environment and sex-selection
technologies: economic development and ultra-sound diagnostics.
Children, we propose, provide two types of benets to parents: psychic
utility and material support in old age. Sons are assumed to have higher pro-
ductivity than daughters. Moreover, sons are assumed to deliver higher psychic
utility, but a married daughter is preferred to an unmarried son. This second
inequality is important but we believe realistic. For instance, in Confucian
teachings the value of a son is closely linked to his having sons, ad innitum.3
When society is poor, the poor in that society may choose sons to support
them in old age although these sons would not be able to marry { the aggre-
gate implication of which is a surplus of sons. As society grows richer, even the
poor may aord married children. The reason is two-fold. First, assuming de-
creasing marginal utility of consumption, the additional consumption aorded
by an unmarried son is less important at higher incomes, rendering a married
daughter (grand-children) more appealing. Second, a richer society likely leads
to a higher bride price (assuming children is a normal good for men), reduc-
ing the economic disadvantage of daughters. If so, as a society grows richer,
3If unmarried sons yielded higher psychic utility than married daughters, everybody
would be better o with sons only, and the population would rapidly vanish.
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the poor may choose daughters who marry over sons who do not, resulting in
a decline in the aggregate sex ratio. The substitution of daughters for sons
among lower-class parents, in turn, allows for the converse substitution among
the upper-class, resulting in the relation between parental status and maleness
of ospring to go from u-shaped to positive as society grows richer.
Explicitly allowing for parents to care about consumption and thus the
earnings ability of their children (net of marriage transfers, if any) provides
a framework for analyzing the impact of development without positing that
development acts on the underlying preference for sons (although that is of
course a possibility [Chung and Das Gupta, 2007, Lipatov et al., 2008]). Eco-
nomic development, in our model, inuences choices by lowering the valuation
of consumption at the margin, which lowers parental valuation of higher earn-
ings potential of sons over daughters, and raises the willingness to pay to have
a married son. The higher bride price further contributes to making a mar-
ried daughter a more attractive option compared to an unmarried son. Lower
fertility, would work to strengthen above shift towards favoring children-who-
have-children. It can be noted that the total fertility rate in South Korea
declined from around 6 in the early 1960s to 1.2 in the 2000s.
Still, the observed pattern in Korea was that of a negative, not a u-shaped,
relationship between parental status and ospring sex ratio. How can we
understand the absence of the rich selecting sons among women born in the
1930s and bearing children in the 1950s through the 1970s? The explanation
for why the poor but not the rich chose sons may lie in the then nature of sex
selection before ultra-sound: infanticide or abandonment.
As with the benets of sons, a psychic and a monetary component can be
identied. When the cost of sex selection is primarily psychic, arguably the
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case before ultra-sound, we might expect the rich to abstain. The rich may
simply have tolerated unwanted daughters as long as the alternative carried
a heavy psychic price tag. Ultra-sound and facultative abortion signicantly
reduce the psychic cost, encouraging uptake by the better o. Another reason
the rich avail themselves of the technology is that they can better aord the
procedures, an argument sometimes raised in the context of India and China
where it has been found that the more educated and more urbane have higher
sex ratios Scharping [2003], Jha et al. [2006]. However, ultra-sound and in-
duced abortion are both relatively simple and cheap, both in absolute terms
and relative to the perceived benets of having a child of the desired sex.4 Be
that as it may, the case for the monetary cost being close to insignicant can
be made convincingly for Korea, now a rich developed country and a member
of the OECD since 1996.
We also present evidence of contemporary sex selection exploiting 2005
Korean Vital statistics. Looking at cross-county variation in sex ratios we
nd that poor counties, or counties with a high adult sex ratio (ages 20-29,
prime marriage years), have lower sex ratios at birth suggesting that current
marriage market conditions inuence the decision of whether to have a girl or
a boy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We conclude this sec-
tion by providing a brief literature review (background describing the Korean
demographics, marriage market, and institutions for old age support is in the
Appendix). Section 2 presents our model of parental sex choice and Section 3
our evidence from Korea. Section 4 concludes.
4A weekly popular magazine reported the cost of sex determination through ultrasound
in 1984 at 60,000 won (USD 75) [Park and Cho, 1995].
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1.1 Literature Review
The arrival of prenatal sex determination in the early 1980s combined with
age old preference for sons have resulted in unnaturally high sex ratios (males
to females) in a number of Asian countries, including the world's two most
populous [Miller, 1981, Das Gupta, 1987, Banister, 1987, Zeng et al., 1993,
Tuljapurkar et al., 1995, Scharping, 2003, Zhu et al., 2009]. While normally,
106 boys per 100 girls are born, the 2000 census revealed 120 boys per 100
girls in China. Indian gures reveal similar discrimination against girls, with
a sex ratio among juveniles at 116.5to 100.
These sex ratios have provoked a number of questions as to the motives
underlying the proclivity to choose sons and, and by extension, whether this
practice will continue in the face of inter alia a mounting surplus of males,
moral suasion, and economic development { sex selection being notably absent
from developed countries (see e.g., Li et al. [2000], Chung and Das Gupta
[2007], Almond and Edlund [2008], Lipatov et al. [2008], Almond et al. [2009]).
This paper's model builds on Edlund [1999], whose main prediction of
positive relation between parental status and maleness of ospring under son
preference and sex choice coincides with that of the Trivers-Willard hypothesis
that natural selection would favor parental ability to adjust sex ratios. Higher
status parents would do better choosing sons not because of a preference for
sons but because male reproductive success is more resource sensitive than
female such.5 The marriage market for the key constraint in these studies,
giving consumption in old age short shrift.
However, most social-science studies of son preference disregard the marital
5Thus, son preference is \supported" by natural selection.
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prospects of children, positing unconditional preference for sons, e.g., Kim
[2005].
The paper's model does not rely on changes to the underlying preference for
sons, although that is a possibility. Chung and Das Gupta [2007] analyzed the
Korea National Fertility and Family Health Surveys (various years) including
questions about about son preference. They found that between 1985 and
2003, there was a marked decline in the fraction of women reporting \must
have a son." A diculty with attitudinal questions, however, is that it is hard
to parse the extent to which answers reects underlying preference or ex post
rationalization of choices.
Somewhat ironically, the modeling of the cultural component of son prefer-
ence and its transmission across generations has been done outside the social
sciences. In Li et al. [2000], the son preference is transferred through inheri-
tance (vertically) or from society (obliquely), where the rate of transmission
is governed by exogenous transmission parameters. In Lipatov et al. [2008]
economic development impacts the cultural preference by eects on the earn-
ings advantage of males. The marriage market feeds back into the cultural
value attached to sons because it is assumed that people who prefer sons also
choose more sons. Consequently, if mating is random and fertility constant,
mothers whose parents had a son preference are under-represented in the next
generation.
The assumptions that preferences and choices coincide, and that mating
is random set these papers apart from our model which traces out aggregate
and cross-sectional implications for sex ratios as a society develops without
assuming that development acts on the cultural valuation of sons. Indeed,
high sex ratios among South and East Asian immigrants to the U.K. and North
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America suggest that such cultural biases may persist in developed societies
[Dubuc and Coleman, 2007, Almond and Edlund, 2008, Almond et al., 2009].
2 Model
We model parental sex choice under son preference where parents care about
grand-children and old-age support, children's spouses are allocated on monog-
amous, two-sided marriage market with an endogenous bride-price. We are
particularly interested in the role of development for the population sex ratio
and who chooses sons and daughters respectively.
Sex choice is assumed perfect but may come at a psychic cost to reect the
reality before ultrasound and prenatal sex choice. Ultrasound is introduced in
the early 1980s. Before that, infanticide was the method of choice to ensure
the right sex, an act that can weigh on the conscience.6 Neither method is free
but the monetary cost is nominal, we would argue.7
Absent sex choice, sons and daughters are assumed to arrive with 50/50
probability.
Key Assumptions
1. Sons are more productive than daughters.
6Abandonment is a sex choice technology that would not aect the population sex ra-
tio, unless abandoned children suered higher mortality or left the country, in which case
abandonment would be similar to infanticide (from a population sex ratio point of view).
However, we will focus on sex selection that removes the child from the population.
7Sex selection through infanticide entails at least one additional pregnancy and concomi-
tant metabolic needs.
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2. Grand-children through sons are more valued than grand-children through
daughters.
3. Grand-children through daughters are better than no grand-children.
Assumption 1 also means that no equilibria can have unmarried daughters (if
a child remains unmarried, that child would yield higher utility to its parents
if male, since more productive). Assumption 2 is in keeping with Confucian
tradition. Assumption 3 is based on the evolutionary argument that an all male
society is a short lived proposition, and therefore the empirically relevant cases
are those which allow for daughters.
The marriage market clears with the help of an endogenous bride price that
we will assume is positive. The rationale behind this assumption is that women
are mothers by the act of giving birth whereas men become fathers through
marriage. The Napoleonic code's succinct summary familial relations { mother
is the woman who bears the child, the father is the husband of mother { is
near universal, e.g., Posner [1992].8 Marriage not only designates the husband
as the father of children borne by the wife but also transfers parental rights
from her to him. Thus, a positive valuation of grand-children means that the
bride price paid by groom parent to bride parent must be positive.
These simple assumptions deliver a model where, if sex choice is costless,
as a society grows richer:
1. The sex ratio declines and asymptotes to 50/50.
8Historically, the only exception we are aware of is Imperial China where the legal mother
of children borne by a concubine was the wife of the concubine's husband. Today, in some
jurisdictions, a gestational carrier (surrogate mother) may sign away her right to be desig-
nated mother.
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2. The cross-sectional relationship between sex ratios and parental SES goes
from u-shaped to positive.
When a society is poor, the lowest tier parents choose non-reproductive
sons. The remaining parents are divided into two equal-sized tiers, the
top tier choose sons who marry the daughters of the second tier.
As society grows richer, the lowest tier can aord to have grand-children
and substitute married daughters for unmarried sons. Greater auence
means that the poor are themselves less poor and that the bride price
increases.
But when Korea was poor, there was no prenatal sex choice. Thus, to
understand the fertility pattern for women born in the 1930s and 1940s it may
be instructive to consider the eects of a psychic cost to sex selection.
In that case, the outcome will depend on the magnitude of the cost. Triv-
ially, a suciently high cost negates the gains from choice and result in a at
relationship between parental status and ospring sex ratio. At the other end,
a low psychic cost results in a softening of the boundaries of the the above
described equilibria, where parents close to the cut-o point roll the dice. In-
between cases may have either the high or the low strata abstain from choosing
sons, a decision that aects other parents since the choice to not select sons
makes more daughters available. A reason the poor might select sons despite it
carrying a psychic cost such that the rest of society abstains (a possible expla-
nation of the negative relationship between maternal education and ospring
sex ratio found for women born in the 1930s), is that the marginal utility of
the extra consumption aorded by an unmarried son might be very high close
to starvation-level consumption.
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2.1 Set Up
We assume a large, two-sex, population.
Marriage is assumed heterosexual and monogamous, and short hands for
children. Marriage is within-cohort and the marriage market clears with the
help of a bride price t. For simplicity, we assume that each married couple has
one child.9 We treat the mother and father as a single decision unit and for
expositional ease we will refer to it as the parent.
Parents are indexed by i 2 [0; 1] where parent i's income is a continuous,
increasing, function of i, yi > yj, for i > j.
Parents strategies are described by the pair (s; n), where s denotes the sex
choice s = fm; f; ng, m { male; f { female, n { none; and  = f0; 1g, 0 { not
married, 1 { married, whether the child marries or not, which in the model
amounts to whether to buy a son a bride. Since t > 0, it is always optimal for
parents to marry daughters. In the case of no sex selection,  = f0; 1g denotes
the whether a son would be given a bride or not.
Consumption depends on exogenous income y(i) and the gender and mar-
ital status of children.10 We assume that sons earn  and daughters zero.
9This is purely for expositional purposes. An earlier version of the paper assumed two
children, which allowed for couples to choose one son and one daughter. Three children
would allow for yet more nely granulated outcomes, etc. However, the qualitative avor of
the model would not change. In Section 3 we consider consequences of relaxing the fertility
restrictions.
10This could be because the parent own the child's income and are responsible for marriage
market payments. Alternatively, the parent cares about the earnings power of its child, net
of marriage market transfers. In the latter case, one could allow incomes and marriage
expenditures to enter as a separate term in utility function, but we opt for the simplifying
assumption that parents own their children.
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A daughter, however, commands a bride price t > 0. For simplicity, we
assume that women are homogenous as brides, so that the bride price is unique
(set by marginal man's willingness to pay for marriage).
Consumption if son marries:
ci = yi +    t:
Consumption if son does not marry:
ci = yi + :
Consumption if daughter marries:
ci = yi + t:
The child also yields psychic benets. We let (s; n) denote the psychic
utility from a child of sex s = fm; f; ng and marital status  = f0; 1g. (n; 0)
denotes the expected psychic utility from the child if chance is allowed to
determine its sex and not marrying the child if a son. Analogously, (n; 1)
denotes the expected psychic utility from rolling the dice on the sex of the
child, and marrying him.
Parents prefer sons to daughters and married children to unmarried chil-
dren, and psychic utility from dierent (s; ) pairs are assumed as follows:
0 = (m; 0) < (n; 0) < (f; 1) < (n; 1) < (m; 1):
In recognition of the moral and psychological toll of post-natal sex selection,
we allow for a psychic cost to sex choice   0.
We assume the following quasi-linear utility function,
12
ui(; c) = f(ci) + (s; )   (1)
where f(c); f 0(c) > 0; f 00(c) < 0; c > 0;.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of strategies (s; ) such that no parent
would obtain higher utility from a dierent strategy than that chosen.
Denition We will say that society A is more developed than society B (and
that B is poorer than A) if yAi > y
B
i ;8i 2 [0; 1]:
We will also use the terms richer and developed synonymously when
referring to societies.
2.1.1 Costless sex selection
In case sex choice carries no psychic cost,  = 0, all parents sex select and the
relevant choices are (m; 0); (f; 1); and (m; 1):
Proposition 1 If  = 0,
1. Equilibria can be described as follows:
i 2 [0; i1) choose (m; 0),
i 2 [i1; i2) choose (f; 1),
i 2 [i2; 1] choose (m; 1).
where 0  i1  i2 and 0 < i2 < 1.
2. The bride price is positive and makes up at least half of the productivity
dierence between a son and a daughter.
3. The bride price is higher in a richer society.
Higher bride price implies that (married) daughters become more attrac-
tive relative to sons (married or unmarried).
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4. If 0 = i1 characterizes the equilibrium for a society, then equilibria for
richer societies are also thus characterized.
That is, if all couples choose children who marries, this would be true in
richer societies as well.
5. If i1 > 0 in a society, then i1 > 0 in poorer societies.
That is, if a society has parents choosing unmarried sons, then poorer
societies would as well.
Corollary 1 As a society grows richer:
1. The sex ratio declines until it reaches unity and then stays balanced.
2. A u-shaped relationship between maleness of ospring and parental status
gives way to a positive relationship.
Corollary 1 is illustrated in Appendix Figure A-3.
Proof:
Intuitively, to see that 0  i1  i2 < 1, note that the associated choices
give successively higher psychic utility and thus must be more expensive (and
therefore chosen by successively richer parents).
Bride price. The equilibrium bride price t must be greater than half of the
productivity advantage of sons:
t > =2:
Otherwise, a married son, (m; 1), would yield higher monetary returns
than a married daughter, (f; 1), and everybody would choose married sons, an
impossibility in equilibrium.
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There are two cases to consider: =2 < t <  and t  .
Case 1: t  .
t   is a sucient condition for a married daughter, (f; 1), to dominate
an unmarried son, (m; 0). Consequently, everybody chooses married children,
and i1 = i2 = 0.
Moreover, in this case, sex ratios must balance, that is i2 = 0:5
To see that an endogenous bride price t >  results in a balanced sex
ratio, note that if there were too many sons, i2 < 0:5, there would be upward
pressure on the bride price, which would raise i2. Conversely, if there were too
many daughters, i2 > 0:5, downward pressure on the bride price would lower
i2, a process that would continue until i2 = 0:5 (assuming that y0:5 supports a
bride price greater than ).
That i > 0:5 choose sons and i < 0:5 choose daughters follows from the
standard assumption that consumption enters concavely in the utility function
and that yi > yj, for i > j (while the psychic utility dierence between a
married son and a married daughter does not). These assumptions also drive
the result that, comparing societies, if one society is richer, its bride price
would also be higher (point 3).
Case 2: =2 < t < : In this case, another type of equilibrium is possible:
i1 > 0 and i2 =
i1+1
2
:
Here, the bride price does not make up for the productivity dierence
between a son a daughter. Note that for (m; 0) to be an equilibrium strategy
for a subset of the population, we need not only that the poor are poor, but
that society is also poor, resulting in a low bride price, t < . That i 2 [0; i1]
follows from decreasing marginal utility of consumption. The lower psychic
utility of an unmarried son compared to a married daughter is oset by higher
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consumption, the utility value of which is the highest for the poor.
For i1 > 0 we need that
f(yi + ) > f(yi + t) + (f; 1))
f(yi + )  f(yi + t) > (f; 1);
which clearly can hold for large enough productivity dierences between men
and women, low enough bride price, low enough valuation of grandchildren
from daughters (relative to no grand-children), or some combination of the
above.
q.e.d.
2.1.2 Psychic cost to sex selection
Allowing for a psychic cost to sex choice can result in a number of dierent
outcomes depending on the magnitude of  . Clearly, a high  reduces the
return to choosing sons. If high status parents refrain from choosing sons, this
reduces the incentives to choose daughters by lower strata.11 The psychic cost
of sex-choice cost can be high enough to deter also the poorest from selecting
sons in which case nobody sex selects.
A more interesting case is if the cost is such that some fraction still choose
unmarried sons. From diminishing marginal utility, those sex selecting would
be the poorest. This is not the only possibility, but one of particular rele-
vance for the Korean case. Therefore, we will spell out the conditions under
which equilibria are characterized by a segment i 2 [0; is] selecting unmarried
sons and the remaining segment i 2 (is; 1] choosing reproductive children but
11Since sons are now from poorer families, the bride price is unlikely to rise.
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not their sex, resulting in male biased aggregate sex ratios and a negative
relationship between parental status and ospring sex ratio.
Note that society would need to be suciently poor for parents to choose
unmarried sons over a randomized (no-choice) strategy which in expectation
would yield the average of the utility from a married daughter and a married
son.
Sucient conditions for i 2 [0; is] choosing (m; 0), and i 2 (is; 1] choosing
(n; 1) are that
(m; 1)  (n; 1) <  ; (2)
and that
 < (s; 0)  (n; 1) + f(yi + )  (f(yi + t) + f(yi   t))=2: (3)
Condition 2 ensures that high status parents prefer to not engage in sex
selection, the gain from selecting a son is at most (m; 1)   (n; 1) > 0.
For low status parents to sex select, it must be that the gain from so doing
exceeds the psychic cost. The gain from selecting a son who does not marry
is the dierence in consumption f(yi + )  (f(yi + t) + f(yi   t))=2 plus the
psychic utility loss from not obtaining grand children (s; 0)  (n; 1). Since
(s; 0)   (n; 1) < 0, the bride price must be lower than the productivity
advantage of males t <  for Condition 3 to hold. From concavity of f() we
see that the upper bound on  increases in lower value of yi.
Condition 2 says that for a suciently high psychic cost to sex selection,
high status parents will not sex select. For sex selection to be undertaken
by the poor, Condition 3 also need to hold. Clearly, for suciently high
marginal utility of consumption Condition 3 holds. In other words, the poor
selecting sons and others not sex selecting, resulting in an overall surplus
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of sons and a negative relationship between parental status and maleness of
ospring, observed for the cohort of women born in the 1930s, is consistent
with a scenario where there is a substantial but not prohibitive psychic cost
to sex selection coupled with poverty.
Note that while Condition 3 is likely to hold for a suciently poor society,
there is no reason to believe economic development bears on whether the better
o sex select. Condition 2 may or may not hold. If it does not, the rich nds it
worthwhile to sex select and there would be a u-shaped relationship between
sex ratios and parental status. Thus, the consideration of a psychic cost to sex
selection can explain absence of sex selection by the rich but does not preclude
it.
2.2 Model Discussion
Our model can account for the decline in the sex ratio seen since the mid 1990s.
It does not account for the increase in the sex ratio between 1980-1995, but
that increase may be the result of technology diusion and the fact that early
cohorts (with respect to ultrasound) have a \rst mover" advantage (since a
high sex ratio in their cohort could \force" younger cohorts to more female).
The model elucidates that scarcity of brides does not guarantee that the
bride price equalizes the economic returns from sons and daughters, a common
feature of poor patriarchal societies [Chung and Das Gupta, 2007]. For married
daughters to bring better material rewards than unmarried sons, society needs
to be suciently rich.
Although sons still are more important than daughters for parents in old
age, there are signs that this lopsidedness is on the vane. First, the private
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transfers from children have become increasingly less important source of the
elderly income in Korea. Gifts from children accounted for 72.4% of the income
of persons aged 60 and older in 1980; it declined to 31.3% by 2003 Kim [2010,
Table 7.17]. Given that sons (especially the eldest son) make more transfers
to parents, this change implies sons became economically less attractive over
time. Second, it looks like daughters are now main care-givers for inrm
parents in Korea (not daughters-in-law), a reason demand might shift in favor
of daughters as society grows richer.
While economic development may aect the extent to which sons are better
providers of old age support than daughters (e.g., lower labor-market gender
pay gap, emancipation of adult children), we have abstracted from that channel
to focus on how higher income aects the valuation of grand-children: the
standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility of consumption imply that
as a society grows richer, parents' willingness to trade consumption for grand
children increases.
3 Sex Ratios in Korea
We now present empirical evidence from Korea where rapid economic growth
and social insurance programs introduced in the 1970s have allowed for alterna-
tive means of old-age security than co-residence with an adult son. Moreover,
as in the rest of the world, prenatal sex determination was introduced in the
1980s in the guise of ultrasound imaging.
We start by showing how the relationship between ospring sex ratios and
parental social status has changed over the past 60 years, going from a negative
to an increasingly positive relationship.
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We then present additional evidence that sex choice is practised in a manner
consistent with parents' considering their children's marriage market prospects
when deciding the sex of their child: parents, especially low status parents,
are less likely to have sons in localities where men face worse marriage market
conditions as measured by adult sex ratios. More men than women among
adults of marriage age, we argue, is a tell-tale sign of bad marriage market
for both men and women, the male sex ratio resulting from women being
more upwardly mobile leaving worse marriage-market localities with a literal
scarcity of women.
3.1 Changes Across Cohorts { 2005 Census
We use a 2% micro random sample of the 2005 Population and Housing Census
(Census, hereafter) to examine the long-term changes in the relationship be-
tween ospring sex ratio and parental status. Of the six Censuses taken from
1980 to 2005, for which micro-data random samples are currently available,
only the 2005 census provides information on the number of all children ever
born by sex, including predeceased children. Thus, the 2005 Census is free
from potential biases arising from selective home-leaving patterns that other
Censuses are subject to.12 Recall bias whereby children abandoned or diseased
12Infant and child mortality would typically be higher in poorer families than in richer
ones. If boys are weaker than girls, as is widely known to be the case, an increase in child
mortality means more deaths of sons than of daughters. For this reason, the sex ratio of
living children is likely to understate the true sex ratio; and such a downward bias should be
larger for poorer families. It is likely that children of poorer parents leave home at a younger
age than auent children. Prior to the 1980s, teenage children of many poor families in
Korea, especially those in rural areas, left home to be employed as factory operatives or
domestic servants. The direction of bias in the sex ratio in this case depends on whether
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in infancy are omitted likely account for the bulk of variation for cohorts bear-
ing the bulk of their children before the 1980s.13 It is worth noting that such
recall bias attenuates an underestimate of the variation in the sex ratio by
parents socio-economic status when sex selection is primarily post-natal, the
case before ultrasound. Another advantage of this Census is that the religion
of respondents is reported.
A weakness of estimating the ospring sex ratios of multiple cohorts from
a single-year census is that only the children of surviving mothers are counted.
However, if the mortality of mothers is not strongly correlated with the gender
of their children, such a survivorship bias should be small.
We focus on mothers 45-75 years of age in the 2005 census. The reason for
limiting the sample to women who had completed child-bearing is two-fold:
First, more educated women tend to have children at older age. Second, son
preference is more strongly revealed for higher-parity births.14 This means
that highly-educated women would be more likely to sex select at a relatively
older age than the less-educated. Thus, if women still of childbearing age were
included in the analysis, the ospring sex ratio of well educated mothers would
be underestimated.
Table 1 reports sex ratios by maternal education for the three successive
children of a particular sex were more likely to leave home earlier, which is unclear. If
daughters tend to leave home earlier than sons, for example, the sex ratio of children living
with parents would overstate the true sex ratio; and this upward bias would be greater for
poorer families than for richer families.
13The naturally occurring variation in sex ratios at birth is small [Almond and Edlund,
2007]
14For example, whereas the overall sex ratio in Korea was 117.2 in 1990, the sex ratio of
the third-parity children was 195.9, and those of fourth- and fth-parity children were 234.4
and 228.8, respectively.
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ten-year cohorts 1931-1940, 1941-1950, and 1951-1960 respectively. The top
panel reports by education level. For the women born between 1931 and 1940,
the ospring sex ratio falls monotonically with maternal education. Women
with primary education of less reports 1.098 boys per girls whereas for women
with a college degree, the sex ratio was a normal 1.05. The relationship be-
tween mother's education and ospring sex ratio remains negative for the
cohort born in the next decade (1941 to 1950), but is substantially atter. Fi-
nally, for the youngest cohort of women who had completed fertility in 2005,
those born between 1951 and 1960, the relationship is positive. The least ed-
ucated reported a sex ratio of 1.044 whereas mothers with a college degree or
more had borne 1.115 sons per daughter. Using father's education instead of
mother's as a measure of parental status provides similar results.15 Figure 2
illustrate this changing pattern.
The education distribution changed dramatically for these cohorts. For in-
stance, women with primary school or less made up 21 percent of the 1951-60
cohort, down from 82 percent among the 1931-40 cohort, and college education
among women grew from 2.2 percent among the older cohort to 14 percent
among the younger. Therefore we group each birth cohort into three educa-
tional categories in an attempt to make each cell size as similar as possible.
The results are presented in the lower panel of Table 1 and (as expected) are
qualitatively similar to those in the upper panel.
The timing of the changes are in line with the predictions of the model.
15The ospring sex ratio of the least educated fathers fell from 1.085 for the 1931-1940
cohort to 1.056 for the 1951-1960 cohort, whereas the ratio of sons to daughters of the college-
educated fathers increased from 1.065 for the 1931-1940 cohort to 1.132 for the 1951-1060
cohort.
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The the 1931-1940 cohort bore their children in the 1950-1980 period. Since
Korea was a much poorer country then and there were no public transfer
programs in place, economic considerations may have played a major role in
the decision whether to favor sons or daughters. On the other hand, women
born in the 1950s did the bulk of their childbearing in the 1970-1995 period,
a quarter century that saw per-capita income increase by 13 times and the
establishment of major social welfare programs. Thus, the 1951-60 cohort was
perhaps the rst who could anticipate other means of old-age support than
co-residence with adult sons.
3.2 Changes Across Cohorts { 1993-2009 Vital Statis-
tics
A disadvantage of restricting the analysis to women who have completed child
bearing is that the picture that emerges is dated. To see how the relationship
between parental SES and ospring sex ratios has changed more recently,
we analyzed Vital Statistics micro data on births from 1993 to 2009. More
specically, we estimated the eects of parental education and occupation
aected ospring sex ratio, and compared the results between children born
in the two sub-periods: 1993 to 2000 and 2001 to 2009.
As is noted earlier, estimating the eect of parental SES on ospring sex
ratio based on the data on mothers still of childbearing age could be subject
to bias problem. To mitigate this problem, we hold mother's age and birth
parity constant by conducting regression analyses.
Mother's education and father's occupation are used as measures of parental
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socioeconomic status.16 It is dicult to determine the SES of parents based
on mother's occupation, because the vast majority of mothers are not working
at the time of childbirth. Mother's education is classied into the following
three categories: (1) college or higher (control group), (2) high school, and
(3) middle school or lower.17 Father's occupation is divided into the following
four categories: (1) white-collar (including professional and clerical jobs), (2)
service and sales, (3) higher blue-collar (skilled workers), and (4) lower blue-
collar (unskilled workers). A very small number of farmers and those whose
occupation is missing are excluded from the analysis.
We conducted logistic regressions to examine the correlates of the proba-
bility that a given child is male.
P soni = + SESi+AGEi+PARITYi+PROV INCEi+ Y EARi+ i; (4)
where P soni denotes the probability that the child is male; SES is a vector of
dummies measuring parental status, education of the mother or occupation
of the father; AGE is mother's age; PARITY is a vector of dummy variables
for birth parity; PROVINCE is a vector of dummy variables for province or
metropolitan city of birth; and YEAR is a vector of dummy variables for the
year of birth.  is the vector of coecients we are interested in, and we expect
lower SES to be associated with lower probability of a son.
16Father's occupation could not be used as a measure of parental SES for older cohorts
because a large fraction of fathers had retired by 2005.
17Among younger female cohorts who gave a birth between 1993 and 2009, there are few
persons with primary school education or lower. The lowest education category (including
no education, primary school, and middle school) accounts for only 2.6% of the sample for
the years 2001 to 2009. Therefore, we did not make any further breakdown.
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To examine if the relationship between parental SES and ospring sex ratio
changed over time, we estimate Equation 4 for the two sub-periods 1993 to
2000 and 2001 to 2009.
The regression results are reported in Table 2, panel A (mother's education)
and panel B (father's occupation). Figures 3 and 4 graphically present SES
gradients in the probability that the child is a boy, with the probabilities
for the top SES categories normalized into 100. For both periods, parental
SES is positively associated with the probability that the newborn child is
a boy. Compared to a child of the top SES family (college-educated mother
and white-collar father, respectively), a child born to a less-educated mother
or to a lower-occupation father were signicantly less likely to be male; and
the absolute magnitude of the coecient for each SES category follows its
hierarchical order.
More importantly, as clearly seen from Figures 3 and 4, SES gradients of the
ospring sex ratio became steeper from 1993-2000 to 2001-2009. For example,
from 1993 to 2000, children born to mothers with middle school education
or lower were about 2.8% less likely to be male; for the period 2001-2009,
the dierence between the top and bottom educational categories increased to
3.2%.
Another noteworthy pattern is that the inuence of birth order is weakened,
consistent with lower fertility and a compression of the distribution (lower
status mothers still bear more children, but less so than in the past).
The results of the regression analysis are consistent with the conclusions
drawn from the records of completed fertility of older female cohorts. If
mother's age and birth order of the child are controlled for, the relationship
between parental SES and the ospring sex ratio is positive for more recent
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female cohorts. Furthermore, it looks like the long-term shift in the relation-
ship between parental SES and ospring sex ratio at birth continued in recent
years.
3.3 Marriage Market Inuences on Sex Ratios at Birth
Our model assumes that parents take their children's marriage market prospects
into account when evaluating respective benets of sons and daughters. In this
section we seek to provide some evidence of such a mechanism.
Faced with the rather complex task of forecasting not only overall marriage
market conditions two to three decades hence, but also a son's competitive-
ness, parents likely resort to a heuristic. One possible heuristic would be to
take the local sex ratio among adults of marrying ages as a signal of future
marriageability of a son.
Seemingly, the local sex ratio of young adults bears little relation to the
marriage market a generation hence. Competition in the marriage market
tends to be with members of adjacent cohorts, not the parent generation.
Would the juvenile (0-5) sex ratio not be more relevant?
One argument for why the adult (local) sex ratio would contain better
information about future marriage market prospects for today's sons in that
locality is that if the marriage market is national, the local sex ratio may
be informative of current local marriage market conditions. For instance, if
the area is relatively poor (assuming that low income men are less attractive
spouses), young women may move out of the area in order to marry men in
richer areas. The scope for such migration would amplied in a country with
an overall decit of brides. Thus, a local male sex ratio among young adults
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could reect young men nding it particularly dicult to marry. Certainly,
men may also migrate but not for marriage reasons. The argument being
that men pay for marriage, so that for men marriage is an expense, while for
women (under individual consent regimes), marriage is a source of income,
e.g., Edlund and Korn [2002]. Assuming that the labor market in richer areas
does not oer higher returns to women worker than men workers, dierential
out migration of young women reect that men in that area compare poorly
to men in other areas, one of us argued in Edlund [2005].
By contrast, variation in the juvenile sex ratio would reect parental sex
choice in the recent past. Choices made based on information available at the
time. Thus, the juvenile sex ratio could may be a dated indicator of beliefs
about the future marriage market.
For our empirical analysis we consider the relationship between the local
(county or district) sex ratio of newborns and the sex ratio of 20 to 29 year-
olds. The ages 20 to 29 were chosen because they constitute key marriage
ages. (Interestingly, we did not nd eects for the anking ages, the 10-19 or
the 30-39 age groups, not reported.)
Sex ratios at birth for each county (or district) were computed from the
micro data on the 2005 Vital Statistics for Birth and Death. The 20 to 29 sex
ratio was calculated using the 2% sample of the 2005 Census. The 2005 Census
was also used to calculate the fraction Buddhists, Protestants, and Catholics
in each locality. Finally, average earnings of employed males aged 20 to 55
in each locality were calculated using micro data from the 2005 Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES).
There were 327 counties and districts in 2005. Of these localities, 249 were
selected based on the following criteria: rst, the total number of births was
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100 or more (253 counties and districts satisfy this condition), and second, the
variables on the sex ratio of younger adults, religion, and earnings from the
Census and the OES are all complete.18
We consider the following sex ratios at birth: (1) the overall sex ratio, (2)
the sex ratio of second- or higher-parity births, (3) the sex ratio of children
born to high-education mothers (those with college education or higher), and
(4) the sex ratio of children born to low-education mothers (those with high
school education or lower). Since discrimination against girls has been found
to be particularly pronounced at higher parity and absent sons, e.g., Das
Gupta [1987], Zeng et al. [1993], Jha et al. [2006], Almond and Edlund [2008],
the relationship between the sex ratio and marriage market condition, if any,
could be more strongly revealed for higher-parity births.19 The third and
fourth variables are considered to examine if the relationship between o-
spring sex ratio and marriage market prospect diers by parental status. With
non-random marriage market matching, sons of poorer parents would be more
vulnerable to an aggregate shortage of brides, which may make poorer parents's
sex choice more sensitive to the local sex ratio.
Figure 5 plots the relationship between the county sex ratios at birth and
the sex ratio of the residents of marriageable age. The overall sex ratio at birth
is negatively related to the sex ratio of young adults, suggesting that parents
are less likely to choose sons in counties where marriage-market prospects
18While it would be useful to look into the male and female earnings separately, the
relatively modest sample size of the OES (about 60,000 employees in total) makes it dicult
to estimate average earnings in each county (or district) for females.
19Although the overall sex ratio at birth has recently returned to a normal level in Korea
(106.1 in 2007), the son-to-daughter ratio for the third or higher parity births remains still
high (115.7 in 2007).
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for males are poorer. This negative relationship stands out more clearly for
second- and higher-parity births, consistent with existing evidence of sex se-
lection being more pronounced at higher parity (top-right panel). For better-
educated mothers, the local marriage-market condition does not appear to
matter much for ospring gender (lower-left panel). For low-education moth-
ers a stronger inuence of marriage market condition on sex ratio at birth
is observed (lower-right panel). This is consistent with non-random marriage
market matching: sons of poorer parents would be more vulnerable to an ag-
gregate shortage of brides (rendering poorer parents's sex choice more sensitive
to the local sex ratio).
3.3.1 Regression Results
The local adult sex ratio is only one predictor of a son's future marriage
market. Therefore, we now turn to regression analysis and estimate by OLS
the following regression equation:
ratioOi = ratio2029i + ln yi + xi + i; (5)
where i subscript indicates the county (or district), ratioOi is the sex ratio at
birth, ratio2029i is the sex ratio of 20-29 year olds, and ln yi is the log of the
average male earnings in the county. These latter two variables are indicators
of marriage market conditions, where we expect higher 20-29 sex ratios and
lower male earnings to lower the sex ratio at birth.
We control for the fraction Christians, xi, to capture possible religious or
cultural inuences on son preference and attitudes towards abortion. Chung
[2007] found Christians to be signicantly less likely to have used induced
abortion to screen out girls in her analysis of the 2000 Korea National Fertility
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and Family Health Survey, a nding echoed in Almond et al. [2009]'s study of
Asian immigrants to Canada using the 2001 Canadian Census.
In alternative specications we also include variables meant to capture the
relative desirability of sons: female relative to male employment and the hous-
ing value in the locality. We expect higher female to male employment to
lower the sex ratio to the extent it indicates higher female to male labor mar-
ket productivity. The eect of housing values are ambiguous for a number of
reasons. Economically prosperous areas have higher housing values, and to the
extent not captured by the other controls, we would expect a positive relation-
ship between housing values and sex ratios. All things equal, however, higher
housing values would make daughters more attractive because traditionally
the parents of the groom are responsible for housing the newly weds.
We estimate Equation 5 for the four sex ratios described above: all births,
second and higher order births, non-college mothers, and college mothers.
The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 presents results for all
births (upper panel) and second and higher order births (lower panel). Table
5 divides the sample by mothers education.
In the rst column, only the adult sex ratio, income of the locality (as
measured by earnings), and the share Christian are included. In the second
column, we add the female to male employment ratio as an index of cross-
sectional variation in the relative productivity of daughters. In the third col-
umn, housing value is substituted for the female to male employment level. In
the fourth column, we use the share of single men among men aged 35-44 in-
stead of the 20-29 sex ratio as an alternative measure of the marriage market.
The choice of this variable is motivated by the observation that a (growing)
bride shortage likely aects the share of men who remain unmarried in their
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late 30s and early 40s (a share that has risen rapidly in the last decade).
Throughout, the share of Christians in the population has a strongly nega-
tive and highly statistically signicant impact on sex ratios and in the interest
of space we omit presenting the coecients (available on request).
Our main variables of interest, however, are the 20-29 sex ratio and county
earnings. As hypothesized, a high 20-29 sex ratio lowers the sex ratio at birth
except for college educated mothers (lower panel, Table 5). The negative
eect is statistically signicant at conventional levels and more pronounced
at higher parities (lower panel, Table 4) and for more marginal mothers (top
panel, Table 5). The eect size is also signicant. Since the adult sex ratio is
driven by migration, there is a fair amount of variation, the standard deviation
being 0.277. For second or higher order births, the estimates suggest that a
county with a 20-29 sex ratio of 1.5 would have a ve percentage points lower
sex ratio at birth than a county with a 20-29 sex ratio of 1.
We include earnings as a proxy for the economic standing of a county.
There are two counter balancing ways income of a county aects sex ratios.
On the one hand, they proxy for the economic motive for parents to prefer
sons and we would expect lower income counties to choose more sons. On the
other hand, lower income also implies a disadvantage in the national marriage
market, and from this mechanism we would expect lower income counties to
have less male sex ratios. While the coecient on earnings is generally positive,
the eect is not statistically signicant (except for non-college mothers, column
1, top panel, Table 5).
The ratio of female to male employment rates is added to the baseline
model as an index of cross-sectional variation in the relative productivity of
daughters. It has reasonably strong negative eect on the ospring sex ratio,
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especially of higher-order births (lower panel, column 2, Table 4) and of low-
educated parents (top panel, column 2, Table 4), consistent with the prediction
of the model.
As for housing value, the results are mixed. Higher value depresses the
male to female ratio except for college educated mothers, but the eect is only
statistically signicant for higher-order births (column 3, Tables 4 and 5).
Finally, as an alternative measure of the local labor market, we substitute
the share who are single among 35-44 year-old men, and nd similar results.
A higher singles share depresses the sex ratio at birth except for college ed-
ucated mothers. The main dierence is that the eect of average earnings
loses signicance further, perhaps due to the fact that men in poorer areas
are more likely to remain unmarried through middle age (the coecient of
correlation between the share of single among 35-44 year-old men and log of
county average earnings is -0.451, p-value < 0.0001).
The one group for whom poor local marriage market conditions does not
seem to have a bearing on the sex ratio is college educated women. A possible
reason is that both sons and daughters of the better educated are socially
and geographically mobile to the point of rendering local marriage market
conditions irrelevant. Another possibility is that the college educated in poor
places are relatively even more elite, a factor could countervail the eects of
being in a disadvantaged area.
3.3.2 Robustness
A question that arises from the baseline results is whether the outcomes merely
reect an urban-rural divide unrelated to the inuence of marriage market
condition on sex selection. For instance, rural areas are not only poorer than
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urban areas but also has worse infrastructure, so that rural resident's access
to prenatal ultrasound examination is worse.
However, the results of additional analysis (reported in Appendix Table
A-9) suggest that not to be the case. The baseline results remain largely un-
changed if the size of population aged 15 to 44 or the total number of births
is controlled for (See Panels A and B). In addition, regression analysis for the
following three subsamples of counties and districts: counties and districts ex-
cluding those in Seoul (Panel C), counties and districts in non-metropolitan
areas (Panel D), and districts in metropolitan areas (Panel E). The results for
the rst two (more rural) samples are largely similar to the baseline results.
The results based on the third (urban) sample depend on the choice of the
measure of marriage market condition. If singlemale3544 is included, the
results are similar to those of the baseline regressions. If ratio2029 is in-
cluded, it is substantially dierent. As will be discussed below, it is perhaps
because the district in metropolitan cities is too narrow a unit of the marriage
market (or the unit of areas within which the expectation of the children's
future marriage-market prospect is formed).
Another question is if county or district is an appropriate unit for ana-
lyzing the eect of marriage-market condition, as implicitly assumed in this
study. More specically, the question is whether the choice of ospring sex
of parents living in a particular county (or district) is determined only by the
conditions within the administrative unit. It perhaps depends on the charac-
teristics of the place. For example, districts in urban areas are relatively small
in size, and probably more highly integrated with neighboring places. If so,
the relevant area for marriage market information could extend beyond the
district (or county). Therefore, the county (or district) level may be appropri-
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ate for smaller rural places, while for large metropolitan area, a more inclusive
geographic grouping might make sense.
Motivated by this conjecture, we construct a new dataset including vari-
ables on marriage-market conditions of neighboring counties or districts. For
instance, a ratio2029 for county j is calculated by dividing the number of
males 20 to 29 years of age by the number of females in the same age group
in county j and all contiguous counties. Another measure of marriage market
condition, a singlemale3544, is constructed similarly.
For the sample of metropolitan cities, regressions employing the wider
denition of marriage market (Panel G, Appendix Table A-9) provide much
more promising results than those based on the original variables on marriage-
market conditions. The new results are generally similar to the baseline re-
sults. The main exception is that the sex ratio of higher-parity births is not
signicantly inuenced by the measures of marriage-market condition, perhaps
reecting the fact that relatively few births in urban areas in 2005 were second
or higher-parity births.
In contrast to the metropolitan sample, the wider denition of marriage
market does not work well for the sample of non-metropolitan areas (Panel F,
Appendix Table A-9). The coecients for the marriage market variables are
all insignicant and dierent in sign from those of the baseline results.
In sum, parental decisions on ospring sex in large metropolitan areas
appear to be aected by the circumstances in neighboring districts and cities,
whereas those in countryside are largely inuenced by the conditions within
the administrative unit.
These ndings also provide an explanation for the relatively poor perfor-
mance of the baseline regressions for the urban sample reported above.
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3.3.3 Evidence on Partner Search Being Local
It is assumed in this study that county/district is a geographic unit within
which parents gather information for forming expectation about their childrens
marriage market condition in the future. This assumption does not require
that county/district is the actual unit of marriage market. If a large fraction of
people actually nd their spouses within the boundary of their county/district
of residence, the assumption behind using the geographic unit will be more
strongly justied.
We have attempted to estimate what fraction of the couples who reported
their marriage in 2005 had lived in the same county or district before they got
married. The Vital Statistics on marriage, compiled from marriage registra-
tion records, provide information on the places of residence where brides and
grooms lived. The ocial guideline for marriage registration asks to report
the address that is given in the current Residence Registration Record. When
a person transfers to a new household because of marriage, she/he is required
to report the change to a local oce, with the reason for the change, such as
marriage. It is thus likely that people report marriage rst, and then transfer
to a new household later.
By comparing the addresses of brides and grooms given in the Vital Statis-
tics, we computed what fraction of couples who reported their marriage in
2005 lived in the same geographic unit. The Col. (1) of Table A-8 suggests
that more than half (52%) of newly-married couples lived in the same coun-
try or district. The fraction of couples from the same county or district was
higher for those whose husband lived in non-metropolitan areas (59%) than
those from metropolitan areas. The result remains true if wifes address is used
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for determining the residence in metropolitan areas. It is probably because
districts in urban areas are relatively small in size, and more highly integrated
with neighboring places. The results also show that three out of four couples
lived in the same city or province according to this measure. It appears quite
rare that a man and a woman from two dierent regions meet and marry in
Korea.
As noted, it is not entirely evident whether the address given in the Vital
Statistics refers to pre-marital place of residence. It is possible that some
couples, especially those who register their marriage long after the beginning
of cohabitation, report their post-marital address. If this is the case, the
percentage of couples who lived in the same county/district prior to marriage
given above should be overestimated.
Additional pieces of information reported in the Vital Statistics, namely,
the dates of actual marriage (or beginning of cohabitation) and of marriage
registration, oer an opportunity to determine the magnitude of this potential
bias. About 14% of all newly-married couples reported marriage before they
married (or started cohabitation). Given the rules for public registrations,
it should be dicult for these couples to report the post-marital address on
marriage registration. It is unknown why they made pre-registration. But a
couple living away from each other prior to marriage would have a greater
incentive to do so, because post-registration would be more costly because of
longer distance between pre-marital and post-marital places of residence. For
these reasons, potential upward bias should be smaller, if any, for this group
of couples.
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4 Summary and Discussion
Sex ratios returned to close to normal levels of 1.06 boys per girls in the mid
2000, down from 1.17 in 1990, a development that has been taken as a sign that
economic development has brought an end to son preference and sex selection.
However, a closer look reveals a pattern to sex ratios consistent with continued
son preference and sex selection: positive correlation between maternal status
and maleness of ospring. Furthermore, this is a new development. For moth-
ers born in the 1930s { bearing their children before ultrasound and Korea
joining the ranks of developed countries { the relationship was the reverse.
Low education mothers reported more sons (relative to daughters) than better
educated mothers. The changing pattern, we have argued, can be understood
in light of the changing nature of sex choice. Before ultrasound, sex choice
entailed infanticide or abandonment of ospring, acts that are nominally free
but can weigh on the conscience.
We have provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of eco-
nomic development on parental sex choice when sons are culturally prized
and children provide old age support. Two key assumptions drive our model.
First, the cultural valuation of children vary not only with gender but also
with marital status. In particular, while a married son is preferred to a mar-
ried daughter, she is preferred to an unmarried son. Second, we assume that
parents of higher social standing are more likely to be able to marry their
son than parents of low status. We use the model to trace out predictions
for how sex ratios would vary over time and cross sectionally with economic
development. We have also presented corroborative evidence data from South
Korea, a country which shares with India and China a strong patriarchal cul-
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ture favoring sons, and a recent past of poverty. Korea went from being a poor
developing country in the 1960s to joining the OECD in 1996.
Explicitly allowing for parents to care about consumption and thus the
earnings ability of their children net of marriage transfers (if any) provides a
framework for analyzing the likely impact of development without positing that
it acts on cultural motives for son preference. Economic development, in our
model, directly inuences choices by lowering the valuation of consumption
at the margin, which lowers parental valuation of higher earnings potential
of sons over daughters, and raises the willingness to pay to have a married
son. The higher bride price, in turn, contributes further to making a married
daughter a more attractive option compared to an unmarried son.
There are of course other avenues through which development may reduce
the material advantage of sons. Less emphasis on physical strength and lower
desired fertility, the earnings gender gap may close. Moreover, with the adop-
tion of more individualistic values, parents' claim on their children's labor may
be lessened (possibly facilitated by growing importance of wage work), further
reducing the importance of dierential earnings by gender. Working age adults
are pulled away from co-residence with their parents through the process of
urbanization, migration and lower importance of land in the production pro-
cess.
Moreover, we nd, in the cross-section, that marriage market conditions
have a bearing on parents' sex choice using vital statistics and census data
from 2005. Poor counties, or counties with a high sex ratio among adults
20-29, had lower sex ratios at birth, suggesting that current marriage market
conditions may impact the decision of whether to have a girl or a boy.
If parents consider the sex ratio among those of marrying ages, and not of
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younger ages, when choosing the sex of their child, this could contribute to
our understanding of why in the case of China, despite more than two decades
of growing decit of girls, parents continue to select boys.
The role of the marriage market in tempering the proclivity to select sons
may also contribute to the understanding of the recent ndings of high ospring
sex ratios among Asian immigrants in a number of Western countries [Dubuc
and Coleman, 2007, Almond and Edlund, 2008, Almond et al., 2009] { being
of high socio-economic status and forming minorities in their host countries,
these groups can run a signicant decit of females without compromising
their sons' ability to marry.
However, the paper's main contribution is to present evidence that despite
close to normal sex ratios in the aggregate and Korea being an advanced
developed country, sex selection is still widely practised.
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Figure 1: Sex Ratio at birth by year
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Figure 2: Ospring Sex Ratio Mothers 45 Years or Older, by Mother's Edu-
cation and Cohort.
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Figure 3: Probability of Son Relative to College Educated Mothers, by
Mother's Education and Over Time.
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Note: The gure graphs the conditional probability of a son corresponding to
Equation 4, also presented in Table 2.
Source: Micro data from Korean Vital Statistics, 1993-2009.
Figure 4: Probability of Son Relative to White-collar Father, by Father's Oc-
cupation and Over Time.
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Figure 5: County or District Sex Ratio at Birth by Adult Sex Ratio (20-29),
2005
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Note: County or district with 100 or more births (249 in total).
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Table 1: Ospring Sex Ratio and Maternal Education { A Changing Pattern
Birth Cohort
1931-40 1941-50 1951-60
Education Percent Sex Ratio Percent Sex Ratio Percent Sex Ratio
Primary or less 82.3 1.098 55.7 1.086 20.6 1.044
Middle school 8.9 1.079 20.6 1.075 25.9 1.105
High school 6.7 1.052 17.7 1.079 39.9 1.090
College 2.2 1.050 6.0 1.066 13.5 1.115
Sum 100 100 100
Education classication based on relative standing
Low 38.9 1.100 55.7 1.086 46.6 1.075
Mid 43.4 1.095 20.6 1.075 39.9 1.090
High 17.7 1.066 23.7 1.076 13.5 1.115
Sum 100 100 100
Source: Computed from the 2% micro sample of the 2005 census.
1931-40: Low (no schooling); Middle (primary school); High (middle school or
higher)
1941-50: Low (primary school or lower); Mid (middle school), High (high
school or higher)
1951-60: Low (middle school or lower); Mid (high school); High (college or
higher)
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Table 2: Parental Characteristics and Probability of Son, Years 1993-2009,
Logistic Regression
Sample Period (mean):
1993-2000 (0.529) 2001-2009 (0.518)
@P son=@x p-value Odds-ratio @P son=@x p-value Odds-ratio
A. Mother's Education
College NI NI
High School -0.0038 0.0272 0.995 -0.0064 0.0017 0.994
Middle School -.01174 <0.0001 0.972 -0.0323 <0.0001 0.968
Mother's Age -0.0105 <0.0001 1.001 -0.0010 0.0002 0.999
Parity
1st NI NI
2nd 0.0438 0.0007 1.045 0.0119 <0.0001 1.012
3rd 0.4684 <0.0001 1.597 0.2008 <0.0001 1.222
4th+ 0.6316 <0.0001 1.880 0.2512 <0.0001 1.286
N 4,746,576 4,273,016
-2LogL w/o covariates 6,563,481 5,917,868
-2LogL w/ covariates 6,542,105 5,914,031
2 20,805 <0.0001 3,817 <0.0001
B. Father's Occupation
White Collar NI NI
Service/Sales -0.0038 0.1194 0.996 -0.0047 0.0559 0.995
Higher blue-collar -0.1174 0.0053 0.993 -0.0095 0.0181 0.991
Lower blue-collar -0.0105 0.0076 0.990 -0.0126 0.0051 0.987
Mother's Age 0.001 0.0008 1.001 -0.0010 0.0007 0.999
Parity
1st NI NI
2nd 0.0457 <0.0001 1.047 0.0113 <0.0001 1.011
3rd 0.4904 <0.0001 1.633 0.2094 <0.0001 1.223
4th+ 0.6736 <0.0001 1.961 0.2451 <0.0001 1.278
N 4,344,489 3,885,319
-2LogL w/o covariates 6,008,299 5,380,940
-2LogL w/ covariates 5,987,792 5,377,270
2 19,901 <0.0001 3,649 <0.0001
Source: Micro data on Korean Vital Statistics from 1993 to 2009.
"NI" denotes "not included (omitted category)." "Middle School" denotes mid-
dle school education or less.
 - the sample is limited to newborns whose fathers reported non-farm occu-
pations.
47
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation
ratio2029 1.02 0.277
singlemale3544 0.182 0.059
Christian (share) 0.254 0.094
Earnings (log) 5.209 0.249
Female/male employment 0.636 0.116
Housing value 13.71 0.666
Source: Measures of sex ratios (dependent variables) were computed from the
2005 Vital Statistics for Birth and Death; the sex ratio of the population
aged 20 to 29 and the proportion Christians are from the 2005 Population
and Housing Census; and the average earnings from the 2005 Occupational
Employment Statistics.
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Table 4: Correlates of County Sex Ratios, OLS
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio at Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All births
ratio2029 -0.045 -0.036 -0.044
(0.028) (0.087) (0.056)
singlemale3544 -0.237
(0.019)
Earnings (log) 0.031 0.022 0.033 0.007
(0.183) (0.359) (0.212) (0.781)
Female/male employment -0.079
(0.157)
Housing value -0.007
(0.476)
Constant 1.012 1.106 1.087 1.124
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.0456 0.0534 0.0354 0.0394
2nd and higher births
ratio2029 -0.094 -0.076 -0.117
(0.002) (0.016) (0.000)
singlemale3544 -0.401
(0.009)
Earnings (log) 0.032 0.013 0.035 -0.003
(0.367) (0.719) (0.388) (0.934)
Female/male employment -0.162
(0.050)
Housing value -0.027
(0.051)
Constant 1.126 1.319 1.513 1.279
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.0638 0.0784 0.110 0.059
Notes: p-values in parentheses.
All regressions include the share Christian.
The level of aggregation is county or district and the number of observations
is 249.
ratio2029 - males over females, ages 20-29.
singlemale3544 - the number of single males aged 35 to 44 divided by the
number of all males aged 35 to 44 in each county (or district) .
Housing value is in won/m2, logged.
Source: Measures of sex ratios (dependent variables) were computed from the
2005 Vital Statistics for Birth and Death; the sex ratio of the population
aged 20 to 29 and the proportion Christians are from the 2005 Population
and Housing Census; and the average earnings from the 2005 Occupational
Employment Statistics.
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Table 5: Correlates of County Sex Ratios, OLS
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio at Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mom: Not college educated
ratio2029 -0.072 -0.055 -0.072
(0.006) (0.042) (0.012)
singlemale3544 -0.470
(0.000)
Earnings (log) 0.056 0.038 0.046 -0.003
(0.066) (0.222) (0.164) (0.922)
Female/male employment -0.155
(0.030)
Housing value -0.009
(0.455)
Constant 0.927 1.111 1.083 1.226
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.06 0.078 0.045 0.066
Mom: College educated
ratio2029 0.047 0.034 0.055
(0.165) (0.328) (0.132)
singlemale3544 0.185
(0.274)
Earnings (log) -0.014 -0.000 0.007 0.027
(0.720) (0.989) (0.864) (0.530)
Female/male employment -0.117
(0.204)
Housing value 0.007
(0.626)
Constant 1.154 1.015 0.928 0.968
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
R2 0.025 0.032 0.023 0.020
Notes: p-values in parentheses.
All regressions include the share Christian.
The level of aggregation is county or district and the number of observations
is 249.
ratio2029 - males over females, ages 20-29.
singlemale3544 - the number of single males aged 35 to 44 divided by the
number of all males aged 35 to 44 in each county (or district) .
Housing value is in won/m2, logged.
Source: Measures of sex ratios (dependent variables) were computed from the
2005 Vital Statistics for Birth and Death; the sex ratio of the population
aged 20 to 29 and the proportion Christians are from the 2005 Population
and Housing Census; and the average earnings from the 2005 Occupational
Employment Statistics.
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Appendix { For Online Publication
Demographic Background Korea
The bride shortage projected for countries like India and China were evident
in Korea already in the 1990s. Thus, the case could made that the current
generation of parents are perhaps quite aware of the diculties low status
males have in nding partners.
Sex ratios decline through life because male mortality exceeds female such
at every age. Absent sex discrimination, cohort sex ratios balance around age
20.20 Figure A-1 (in Appendix, as all tables and gures in this section) plots
the population by age and gender in 2009. As can be seen, men outnumber
women until age 55, indicating excess female mortality predating ultrasound
screening [Goodkind, 1996]. This is not to say ultrasound had no impact. The
male surplus is larger for the younger cohorts, especially those who were born
in the late 1980s, early 1990s, some ten plus years following the introduction
of the technology. This is further illustrated in Figure A-2 which plots the sex
ratio by age.
What is also evident from Figure A-1 is a marked slowdown in fertility,
which has further exacerbated the marriage squeeze facing Korean men, who
on average marry women three years younger than themselves.21 The total
fertility rate went from 6 in the 1960s, to 4.5 in 1970 to below replacement
level in the early 1980s, and is now one of the lowest in the world at some 1.2
children per woman.22 Cohort sizes halved in the last three decades and thus
20The crossing-over normally happen around age 20. For instance, the US 1980 census
counted 10,663 thousand males to 10,655 thousand females in the age group 20-24. Later
censuses show slightly later crossing over points, a fact that might be driven by immigration.
21This age gap has been quite stable since 1990.
22TFR was 1.08 in 2005; 1.13 in 2006; 1.26 in 2007 (Korea National Statistics Oce, 2007
Annual Report on Live Births and Death Statistics).
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\surplus" men born in say 1980 seeking brides from the 1983 cohort face a sex
ratio of 1.24, or a decit of some 80,000 women, see Figure A-3.
Figure A-4 presents the gender gap among singles by age for the years
1985, 1995 and 2005 (drawn form the micro samples of the censuses). Since
men marry women on average three years younger than themselves, at young
ages, men outnumber women among the unmarried. As men move into prime
marriage ages (and women out), the gap dwindles to eventually turn negative.
In 1985, the number of single men and women balanced by age 34. In 1995,
parity is only reached at age 38 and in 2005, this age had been further pushed
back to 44 { a change by 11 years despite the age at marriage only having
moved by 3 years over the period.23
The decit of women of marriageable age has visibly impacted marriage
patterns. While in 1981, men were almost three times as likely to remarry as
women, by the mid-90s, women had overtaken men, and in 2005 there were 1.5
more marriages between a remarrying bride and never-married groom, than
the reverse combination, Figure A-5.24
Low status men have been the men hardest hit by the decit of brides
The percentage of males aged 35 to 44 who remained unmarried is negatively
correlated with educational attainment and quality of occupation, Table A-7.
(Interestingly, the results for females are nearly the opposite.)
Lately, Korean men unable to marry nationals have turned to poorer Asian
countries for brides { the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and China being
major source countries. In 2006, 9 percent of marriages involved a foreign
23Male and female average age at rst marriage was 27.8 and 24.8 respectively in 1990
and 31.1 and 28.1 in 2007.
24As a comparison, the fraction of marriages where it is the bride's rst marriage but the
groom's second or higher marriage was slightly lower than the reverse combination in the
US, Statistical Abstract, 2000, table 145, covering the years 1970 to 1988.
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bride, up from less than one percent in 1990. Among men in agriculture or
shery, low status occupations, 41 percent of grooms married foreign women
2006.25 Although Korea's economic development has aorded even its poorest
men brides, such foreign marriages have been warily received by a culturally
and ethically homogenous society.26
Bride price and old age support
Korea adheres to the Confucian tradition in which it is the groom's (or
rather, his parents') responsibility to provide housing for the newly-weds. In
the case of the oldest son, this residence would be shared with his parents,
an important form of old age support. Parents of daughters would see their
daughters being provided for, but would not benet from co-residence with
prime-aged adults. Thus, while the tradition implies that the groom side
contributes more resources to the new couple than the bride side, the implicit
bride price only benets the parents of daughters indirectly (their daughter
and her children are provided for) and may leave them at a disadvantage in
old age, a common feature of pre-industrial patriarchal societies [Das Gupta
et al., 2003].
Over the last several decades, the advantage of sons over daughters became
weaker as public old-age pension system was introduced and traditional social
norms were gradually replaced by the Western-style individualism.27 For in-
stance, the extended family has given way to the nuclear family reected in a
decline in co-residence with old-age parents and other forms of old-age support
25Vital Statistics of Korea, Marriage and Divorce.
26The topic of numerous newspaper articles, for instance, \Korean Men Use Brokers to
Find Brides in Vietnam," The New York Times, February 22, 2007.
27The original old-age pension law was passed in 1973, although its implementation was
postponed due to the oil crisis. The National Pension System was nally created in 1988
based on a new law passed in 1986, and its coverage expanded over the 1990s.
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Figure A-1: Population by Age and Gender, 2009
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Source: 2009 Projected Population in Korea; Drawn from the website of Ko-
rean Statistical Information Service (http://www.kosis.kr).
Note: According to the Chinese zodiac, children born in the year of the Horse
(12-year cycle) are independent and rebellious, characters considered partic-
ularly troublesome in daughters. Every 60 years, the year of the Fire Horse,
these traits are exaggerated. The dates of the last Fire Horse occurred 21
January 1966 - 8 February 1967.
from child to parent (such as transfers). While these changes applied across
the board, they may have been more important for the poor who relied more
heavily on their sons for old age support.
Figure A-6 graphs the percent of elderly being primarily supported by
their sons for support by education between 1994 and 2006. Two facts stand
out. First, the less educated are more reliant on sons. In 1994, 70% of those
with only primary education relied on sons, whereas the corresponding gure
for those with a college education was slightly lower than 40%. Second, in
the relatively short period 1994-2006, there has been almost a halving in the
reliance on sons, from close to 50% in 1994 to 27% in 2006.
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Figure A-2: Sex Ratio by Age, Korea and the US
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in Korea; Drawn from the website of Korean Statistical Information Service
(http://www.kosis.kr).
Figure A-3: Sex Ratio by Age, 2009. Same cohort and lagged three years.
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Figure A-4: Excess Single Men by Age, Various Census Years
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Figure A-5: Number of marriages where one spouse was previously married,
by year.
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Figure A-6: Reliance on Sons for Old Age Support, by Year and Education.
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Table A-6: Completed fertility by maternal education and cohort
Parental Education
Birth Year Primary or less Middle High College or higher
1931-1940 4.339 3.604 3.215 2.919
1941-1950 3.456 2.811 2.547 2.326
1951-1960 2.551 2.199 2.017 1.928
Source: Korean 2005 Census, 2% micro sample.
Table A-7: Never Married, Ages 35-44
Men Women
N Percent N Percent
Education:
Primary or Lower 1,803 39.05 2,707 6.43
Middle School 4,370 26.18 7,312 2.80
High School 33,501 15.54 42,209 4.19
College 32,402 9.08 23,220 7.31
Graduate School 4,905 6.32 2,038 16.49
All 76,981 13.39 77,486 5.40
Occupation:
Professional 10,330 5.49 4,940 11.96
Clerical/Service/Sales 30,029 7.96 22,525 7.45
Operatives 20,661 12.45 5,284 3.77
Farmer 3,233 21.16 2,553 1.33
Unskilled 4,359 21.79 2,493 3.57
Not Working 7,720 40.25 39,578 3.98
All 76,332 13.45 77,373 5.38
Source: Korean 2005 Census, 2% micro sample.
Individuals whose occupation was unclassied were excluded from the calcu-
lation.
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